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ABSTRACT
During disasters, crisis, and emergencies the public relies
on online services provided by authorities to receive timely
alerts, trustworthy information, and access to relief programs.
It is therefore crucial for the authorities to reduce risks when
accessing their Web services. This includes proper naming
(e.g., against phishing attacks), name protection (e.g., against
forged DNS data), adequate identification (e.g., against spoof-
ing and impersonation), and transport security (e.g., against
traffic manipulation).
In this paper, we take a first look on Alerting Authorities
in the U.S. and measure the deployment of domain names,
DNSSEC, and Web certificates related to their websites. Sur-
prisingly, many do not take advantage of existing methods
to increase security and reliability. Analyzing 1,388 Alerting
Authorities, backed by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), we are alarmed by three major findings.
First, 50% of the domain names are registered under generic
top-level domains, which simplifies phishing. Second, only
8% of the domain names are secured by DNSSEC and about
15% of all hosts fail to provide valid certificates. Third, there
is a worrying trend of using shared certificates, which in-
creases dependencies leading to instability in the future.
1 INTRODUCTION
Online media have been proven to be an effective channel to
communicate with the public. An ever growing number of
Americans prefer to get their news online [48], social media
is being used for public health announcements [105], and
authorities provide public disaster education and services via
web portals [39]—to mention a few examples. Communica-
tion of critical information such as emergency response [10,
Chapter 3] and provision of critical services are no excep-
tion to this trend. Research shows that in emergencies the
public turns to official and authoritative sources especially
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Figure 1: Accessing data from an Alerting Authority
when specific, precise, and trustworthy information is re-
quested [21, 25, 35]. During the coronavirus pandemic out-
break in the U.S., for example, government institutions and
health authorities were perceived as the most (social me-
dia being the least) trustworthy sources of information by
the public [42, 91]: alone in the first month of the outbreak,
nearly half a billion visits were registered on websites of Cen-
ters for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) [5], while the high amount
of visits on state unemployment websites brought many to a
crash [17].
The ever-evolving landscape of web technologies, how-
ever, poses real operational challenges for organizations try-
ing to maintain an up-to-date and secure online infrastruc-
ture. More than a decade after the introduction of the E-
Government Act of 2002 [1] that lead to flourishing of govern-
ment web portals [90], the federal government is investing
two-thirds of its IT budget on maintaining legacy systems
to mitigate existing operational and security risks [2]. To en-
counter spoofing attempts, data tampering, or disinformation
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attacks, which are no exception to digital emergency com-
munication (even during the coronavirus pandemic [109]),
adequate security measures have to be taken. As minimal
base, web-based emergency information and service provi-
sion should meet (i) data source identification, and (ii) data
integrity and confidentiality. To this purpose, a domain name
and its structural position within the domain namespace
coupled with a digital certificate cater for data source iden-
tification (as an extension of authentication) given that the
domain name itself is authenticated (DNSSEC). And trans-
port layer security protocols (SSL/TLS) can be used for data
integrity and confidentiality (see Figure 1).
In this paper, we aim to address the research blind spot
of trustworthy and secure web-based emergency services.
We systematically investigate the digital representation of
emergency and disaster management organizations in the
U.S. through the lens of DNS(SEC) and Web PKI. Our goal is
to understand whether and how specific integration of these
organizations in the domain namespace and their use of
DNSSEC and X.509 certificates can mitigate threats against
trustworthy communication.
Our key findings are: (i) only half of 1388 investigated
organizations have their own dedicated domain names but
dependend on other entities for their online presence, (ii)
about 80%, i.e., 1047 out of a total 1327 unique hosts, lack
sufficient measures for unique identification (a requirement
of trustworthiness), and (iii) throughout the past decade a
rise of multitenancy structures and shared certificates has
expanded the attack surfaces.
The point of departure for our study is the list of alerting
authorities (AA) provided by the US Federal Emergency Man-
agement Angency (FEMA) [41], which comprises all entities
(governmental and NGOs) on federal, state, territorial, tribal,
and local levels authorized to dispatch alerts. In detail, in
this paper we contribute:
(1) Method (Section 4). Our method identifies common
public alerting authorities in the U.S. and correspond-
ing websites. The modular and configurable pipeline
introduced here for data collection and analysis main-
tains a certain level of generality which makes it suit-
able to be extended to non-U.S. regions in future work.
(2) Analysis of namespace structure and protection
(Section 5). We map names of alerting authorities to
fully qualified domain names (FQDN) and identify op-
erational dependencies. We reveal that only 50% of
unique domains names make use of designated names-
paces (e.g., .gov, .ngo) and that only 8% use DNSSEC.
Finally, respective implications of domain namespace
and DNSSEC for trustworthy communication are dis-
cussed. We investigated whether there are discrep-
ancies between organizations from various fields of
operation (e.g., governmental, military, . . . ).
(3) Analysis of website protection (Section 6)We ana-
lyze transport layer security protocols and certificates
dedicated to protect websites of alerting authorities.
On the one hand the historical and actual usage of
X.509 is studied, and on the other hand it is investi-
gated how widespread these technologies are, which
certificate authorities are leading the market among
AAs, and how (automated) domain-validation certifi-
cates affect source identification.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that
investigates the security profile of official Alerting Authori-
ties. After presenting background and our results, we discuss
improving measures and conclude with an outlook.
2 BACKGROUND
Emergency management (EM) can be understood as an on-
going cycle of mitigating, preparing for, responding to, and
recovering from incidents that threaten life, property, oper-
ations, or the environment [11, 15]. The core objectives of
emergency management, ranging from coordination efforts
to raising awareness and critical service provision, are car-
ried out by governmental agencies, NGOs, volunteer groups,
and international organizations. The structure and organiza-
tion of these entities differ in each country and even on local
and regional levels. In the U.S., the list of Alerting Authorities
regularly published by FEMA [41] provides a non-exhaustive
overview of organizations which are (directly or indirectly)
involved in the process of emergency management.
In each phase of EM cycle, communication (between and
among authorities and the public) plays an integral role
not just as a mere necessity but also in amounting to so-
cial resilience [70]. Beside using dedicated alerting systems,
e.g., FEMA’s Integrated Public Alert &Warning System [40], so-
cial media, or similar channels for information dissemination,
many of involved organizations have their own dedicated
websites not only for informational purposes but also for
services such as volunteer registry or disaster aid application
(e.g., Homeland Security’s disasterassistance.gov).
The main challenge for the public during emergency and
crisis is navigating through online service providers and
evaluating their credibility and trustworthiness [71]. Specif-
ically as people are most vulnerable and reliant on exter-
nal aid, access to trustworthy infrastructure is necessary
to refrain malicious actors from causing financial, political,
or other societal harm. The global outbreak of the novel
coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) is an example of how desperate
times pave the way for online disinformation, scam, and
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fraud: the parallel infodemic [109], i.e., the over-abundance
of information, which despite efforts from top tech compa-
nies [101] continued to grow and prevail [16], posed serious
challenges both to politics and public health; and the growing
number of individuals and business relying on unemploy-
ment insurance and governmental relief programs led to a
boom in online fraud and scam. For example, a spoofing cam-
paign in Germany managed to successfully impersonate the
state government of North Rhine-Westphalia and redirect
financial aid for businesses (comparable to U.S. PPP [82])
to illegitimate bank accounts. Instead of the original do-
main name soforthilfe-corona.nrw.de, scammers used
two closely related names soforthilfecorona-nrw.de and
nrw-corona-soforthilfe.de and managed to register up
to 4000 applications for relief funds before the State Criminal
Police Office confiscated the domain names. It is noteworthy
that these domains had DNSSEC enabled and were issued
valid certificates from Let’s Encrypt. This and similar inci-
dents are avoidable by having trustworthy TLDs that care-
fully verify delegation of their second-level domain names
and certificates authorities that enforce rigorous authenti-
cation before certification. In the following a brief overview
is given on how DNS namespace, DNSSEC, Web PKI, and
SSL/TLS amount to trustworthy communication, specifically
in case of emergency services with heightened security re-
quirements.
DNS(SEC). The global domain name system (DNS), a dis-
tributed key-value database with a hierarchical namespace
and management scheme, is de facto the entry point to many
(if not all) of Internet services. Respectively, for critical ser-
vice providers, e.g., Alerting Authorities, it is indispensable
to be represented within namespaces protected both in orga-
nizational and technical terms: TLDs with restricted naming
and delegation policies protect domain name owners against
name and trademark violations while assuring end users
that the domain name owner has undergone some form of
vetting; at the same time, DNSSEC [9] compensates the vul-
nerable client/server paradigm of DNS [12] and caters for
authenticated delegation and protect DNS data against tam-
pering.
Web PKI. To authenticate the content provider behind a
domain name X.509 certificates [27] are used. The seman-
tics of a certificate depends on its certification process: if
the real-world entity behind a certificate is vetted by a cer-
tification authority (CA) and is respectively awarded with
an organization or extended validation certificate (OV/EV),
the certificate can used for identification. Otherwise, if the
validation is limited to the ownership of a domain name,
i.e., domain validation (DV), the certificate is only good for
authenticated confidentiality and integrity. By presenting an
OV or EV certificate bound to a real-world entity, an online
service provider gives its clients the chance to verify with
whom they are communicating, an issue which is at the heart
of emergency communication as discussed above.
The certification ecosystem has been subject to criticism
as the encompassing authority of each CA (due to lack of
subordination rule [61]) poses a major threat to the global
namespace if any of root CAs is compromised. Two notewor-
thy complementary technologies that can help against this
threat are Certificate Transparency (CT) [67, 97], which al-
lows monitoring certification to detect any misissuance, and
DANE [52] which enables domain owners to put constraints
on authorized certificates or CAs.
Transport Layer Security. The final step in trustworthy
communication is securing data. SSL/TLS protocols enable
two parties to negotiate communication parameters in terms
of authentication (based on X.509 certificates), confidentiality
through encryption, and integrity using message authentica-
tion codes (MAC). Specially critical data which is transmitted
as part of emergency service provision, e.g., medical records
or bank codes, pose a high risk to theft and needs to be
protected with extra care.
3 THREAT ANALYSIS OF
TRUSTWORTHY COMMUNICATION
The concept of trustworthy communication that we consider
in this paper assumes preexisting trust relations in the real
world and allows to apply these in online communication
if the real-world entity behind a digital representation is
uniquely identifiable. In this sense, spoofing and imperson-
ation, and by extension tempering and data disclosure, are
the main threats to trustworthiness. Here, we focus on tech-
nical, i.e., security, and organizational measures taken by
a service provider which help to mitigate threats to afore-
mentioned threats regardless of how a user, its communica-
tion client, e.g., browser, or other intermediate components,
e.g., recursive resolvers, honor these measures. Respectively,
we define assurance profiles and use these in our further
analysis to evaluate Alerting Authorities.
To better understand how such threats can effectively be
mitigated, we analyze actual cases of online fraud during
the coronavirus pandemic as reported by news outlets, gov-
ernmental and commercial security entities, and our own
observations from a collected set of domain names includ-
ing terms corona or covid from various public CT logs. We
observed two conspicuous characteristics of phishing por-
tals (comprising the majority of fraudulent websites): (i) the
prevalent use of open namespaces and new gTLDs with no
delegation restrictions, as for instance coronavirusgov.us
spoofing coronavirus.gov, and (ii) exclusive use of DV cer-
tificates as commonly issued by Let’s Encrypt. These char-
acteristics, however, are not limited to malicious websites
3
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Table 1: Interplay of DNS and X.509 certificate charac-
teristics to provide different levels of assurance.
Domain Name Certificate2 Auth3
Restricted
delegation1
Supports
DNSSEC DV O/EV N
am
e
ID Assurance
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Strong  
✘ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ (✓)
Weak G#✓ ✘ ✓ ✓ ✘ ✓
✘ ✘ ✓ ✓ ✘ (✓)
* * ✓ ✘ * ✘ Inadequate #
* * ✘ ✘ * ✘
1 Name delegation reserved for eligible entities
2 DV: domain validation, O/EV: organization or extended validation (implies domain
validation as well)
3 Authentication of DNS data and content provider identity
4 ✓: support , ✘: no support, *: support or no support (entry value is immaterial)
and even legitimate ones, e.g., covid19responsefund.org
(fundraising portal of World Health Organization), exhibit
the similar profiles. Evidently, minimal organizational and
financial costs are the main incentives for both malicious
and legitimate websites.
Based on these observations, we argue that the bestmethod
of mitigation is increasing the cost of spoofing and imperson-
ation on two dimensions of name and identity authentication,
thus making it unattractive (if not impossible) for malicious
actors. On the one hand, legitimate actors should confine
themselves to closed registries and enable DNSSEC to miti-
gate DNS hijacking. Stricter eligibility requirements of closed
registries not only provides extra assurance regarding the
owner, it also poses an additional organizational hurdle that
cannot be fulfilled by illegitimate actors. Specially in the
U.S., specific closed namespaces can be leveraged by vari-
ous types of entities involved in emergency management,
i.e., .gov or .us locality namespace for governmental, .mil
for military, .edu for education, .ngo for non-governmental,
and .int for international organizations (see §2). On the
other hand, DV certificates should be avoided in favor of
OV or EV certificates for adequate identity authentication.
Table 1 enumerates different combination of measures that
can be taken to cater for trustworthy web communication
grouped by level of assurance:
Strong ( ): combination of closed registry and secured
domain name (DNSSEC) alongside an OV/EV certifi-
cate provides strong assurance against name and iden-
tity spoofing, phishing, and impersonation in general.
Weak (G#): OV/EV certificates combined with open reg-
istries as well as lack of DNSSEC are considered as
DNS Domainname
CA Certificate
Identification
SSL/TLS
Integrity/
confidentiality
Trust
Context
Figure 2: Dependencies among components amount-
ing to trustworthy communication
weak since the former lacks the extra vetting and as-
surance (easier spoofing), and the latter is susceptible
to DNS hijacking and domain impersonation [98].
Inadequate (#): providing only a DV certificate defeats
the purpose of identification and having no certificate
at all poses the risk of tampering and information dis-
closure.
It should be noted that there is no single feature that can
guarantee strong assurance. Even the presence of an OV/EV
certificate alone is considered as weak if the respective do-
main name is not under a restricted namespace (see ID au-
thentication column in Table 1).
The practical implications from an operational perspec-
tive is visualized in the dependency graph of Figure 2, from
which two important insights can be taken: (i) both web
PKI certificates and SSL/TLS are practically dependent1on
domain names, and (ii) transport layer security measures are
indispensable in establishing trust.
4 METHOD AND DATA CORPUS
The subject of study in this paper are the U.S. organizations
involved in EM. Due to lack of a central registry, we focus
on the list of Alerting Authorities maintained by FEMA. Al-
though this list might not include each and every entity
involved in emergency management, it provides a decent,
legitimate overview over this field comprising a wide spec-
trum of organizations ranging from local governments, law
enforcement agencies, and military bases to NGOs and uni-
versities. Each entry represents an organization by a unique
ID, a name, and a territory of operation (including unincorpo-
rated territories). Throughout this study, we use the AA list
from September 11, 2019 comprising 1,388 entries, excluding
a single duplicate entry.
1Although certificates can directly be bound to IP addresses, it would reduce
the usability and flexibility of both servers and clients. Furthermore, by
waiving the use of certificates SSL/TLS protocols can technically provide
confidentiality and integritywithout authentication butwould be susceptible
to monkey-in-the-middle attacks.
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1. Preparation Phase 2. Domain Namespace Analysis
3. Web PKI Analysis 4. Statistics1.1 Fetch / parse
AA list
1.2 Collect
URLS
1.3 Sanitize /
filter URLs
2.1 Parse URLs/
extract hosts
2.2 Check for
DNSSEC
2.3 Categorize
TLDs
2.4 Classify
owners
3.1 Check
SSL/TLS
Active
certs
Vulnerabilities
3.2 Certificate
transparency
Logged
certs
3.3 Analyze
certs
Sanitize
data
Figure 3: Toolchain to gather and analyze data about Alerting Authorities in the U.S.
Our method consists of three phases: (1) preparation phase
in which AA names were mapped to their respective domain
names, (2) domain namespace analysis, and (3) Web PKI anal-
ysis. Our measurements were carried out from October 2019
up to March 2020 with each measurement being executed
at least twice from various vantage points in Europe and
the U.S. to detect any possible vantage point dependent dis-
crepancies, e.g., limited access due to geo-blocking. Figure 3
summarizes our methodology from preparation phase to data
gathering and final analysis (see Sections 5 and 6).
(1) Preparation. In the preparation phase, we first retrieve
and parse the AA list and then map each entity to one of the
following fields of operation by matching the names against
list of predefined keywords (see Appendix):
Public safety: Fire departments, emergency manage-
ment agencies, etc.
Governmental: Governing authorities such as towns,
counties, and councils
Law enforcement: Police departments, sheriffs, home-
land security, etc.
Military: Army bases, forts, etc.
Educational: Universities
It is worth noting that even though police and homeland
security are also responsible for the broader task of public
safety, we decided to assign them to law enforcement.
We will use this classification scheme to better understand
whether there are any domain-specific operational practices,
such as choices of names or certificate providers.
(2) Domain Namespace Analysis. In the second phase,
we assign the domain name used for Web services for each
organization. To identify the primary website of an alerting
authority, we query and scrape Google search engine. For
each entry in the AA list, the combination of name and ter-
ritory of operation (e.g., Fresno Police Department CA) was
used as query string. Each query yielded between 4 and 12 re-
sults. Since the results are not necessarily ranked to have the
official URL first, we excluded results based on a list of inapt
domain names (e.g., social media sites and yellow pages). The
topmost remaining URL was then selected for the respective
organization. Finally, the list of collected URLs was manually
checked to remove any mismatches and falsely associated
URLs which were not detected automatically, e.g., same URL
for homonymous counties in different states. A total of 23
entries were removed: 11 entries with mismatched names,
11 associated with the wrong territory of operation, and 1
with no matching URL at all; leaving a total of 1, 365 entries
for further analysis.
The remainingURLs (e.g., https://www.fresno.gov/police)
were parsed to extract the FQDNs (e.g., www.fresno.gov)
and path segments (e.g., /police). The results of our analysis
on domains names is presented in Section 5.
(3) Web PKI Analysis. Finally, domain names were used
to investigate the current and historic adaption of Web PKI
certificates and SSL/TLS protocols by respective hosts. To
study the current state, OpenSSL version 1.1.1d CLI was
leveraged to fetch complete certificate chains, perform val-
idation, and verify revocation status using stapled Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [3], manual OCSP [96],
or Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) [27], depending on
availability. We also leveraged testssl.sh2, a command line
penetration testing tool, to gather information and perform
tests on SSL/TLS enabled hosts. We collected data of 1,185
unique hosts comprising information about server configu-
ration (e.g., supported SSL/TLS protocols and cipher suites)
and susceptibility to known vulnerabilities.
2https://testssl.sh/
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For our historical analysis, we used CT logs [67, 97]. To
this mean we leveraged the publicly accessible database pro-
vided by Sectigo under crt.sh, which audits 79 log servers
from 12 organizations (at the time of writing). For any given
host name, the database was queried for certificates which
have the host name or a wildcard covering the host name as
their subject name or have it included in the list of subject
alternative names (SAN). From a total of 28, 370 retrieved
unique certificates, 10, 826were pre-certificates and are omit-
ted from further analysis. The remaining 17, 544 certificates
were then limited to those issued in the past decade (2009-
2019), leaving a total number of 17, 477 certificates which
are analyzed as described in Section 6.
5 DNS NAMESPACE ANALYSIS
By studying the domain names of alerting authorities, we
aim to answer the following questions:
(1) Does each AA have its own dedicated domain name?
(2) How do AAs integrate in the global DNS namespace?
(3) Do AAs secure their names using DNSSEC?
The first question is concerned with how Alerting Authori-
ties maintain their online presence, and avoid unnecessary
dependencies. Lack of a dedicated name, for example, leads
to dependence on someone else for authentication and data
security as X.509 certificates are bound to domain names (see
Figure 2). The second question aims to investigate whether
AAs prefer specific TLDs to take advantages of recognizabil-
ity (e.g., governmental organization under .gov) and security
(restricted vs. non-restricted TLDs). Finally, the last question
regards measures taken in securing names against threats
such as spoofing or DNS hijacking which can also lead to
impersonation and phishing.
5.1 Dedicated Domain Names
We consider an AA to have a dedicated DNS name either if
it has its own name directly under a top-level domain [53],
or has been assigned a sub-domain under the namespace of
its parenting organization or any generic service provider,
which is not shared. For example, the Tehama County Sheriff
(tehamaso.org) has its own dedicated namewhereasApache
County Sheriffs Office (www.co.apache.az.us/sheriff/) does
not.
To measure dedicated domain names we divided the set
of AA URLs into two groups depending on whether the URL
path segment is empty (674 entries) or not (691 entries);
the group with empty path segments was then regarded
as having dedicated names. To prevent false positives of
non-dedicated names, we manually examined all these web-
sites and verified that the landing page does not relate to
the Alerting Authority. We found only 25 false positives
(e.g., http://www.franklincountyema.org/db/ with /db
us
isa
<inter-state
authority>
nsn
<native
sovereign
nation>
<state-code>
state
<state
agency>
<locality>
ci
<city
agency>
co
<county
agency>
. . .
. . .
fed
<federal
agency>
Figure 4: Excerpt of .us namespace structure [26, 77]
.
path being the start page), which leads to overall ≈ 51% AAs
with dedicated names while the rest represents common
names of parent organizations or other service providers.
We also observed three emergency management agencies
with dedicated names which are redirected (using HTTP
301/302 response codes) to web pages under county or state
websites. Out of the total 1,365 collected URLs 1,327 unique
domain names exist, showing that in some cases multiple
entities are subsumed under the same domain, e.g., different
agencies all under the domain name of a single state.
The data also shows that all educational entities (total of
4) and over 90% of governmental entities (467 out of 503)
such as state and local governments own dedicated names
in contrast to only ≈ 25% of public safety entities (164 out
of 669), and less than half of military organizations (8 out of
19) which nearly all are represented under home.army.mil.
5.2 Namespace Structure
The point of departure for our analysis are various top-level
domains (TLDs) and country code second-level domains (cc-
SLDs) in use by alerting authorities, which we group as fol-
low:
gTLD [58]: generic top-level domains, e.g., .org
ccTLD [57]: country code top.level domain, e.g., .us
ccSLD [59]: country code 2nd-lvl domain, e.g., .ny.us
sTLD [60]: sponsored top-level domains, e.g., .mil
Each TLD group features different properties. In general,
there are little to no delegation limits and naming conven-
tions for names under gTLDs or ccTLDs except for the .us
namespace. Under .us ccTLD more than 3,000 names are
reserved and unavailable for public registration [76] and the
namespace has a rigorous structure with domain names at
second, third, or fourth levels. This structuring reflects the
“political geography” [26] and defines a number of reserved
names for designated organizations or purposes, e.g., county
or city, and territory of operation (see Figure 4). Finally, spon-
sored TLDs (.edu, .gov, and .mil) impose stricter eligibility
requirements and thus have an advantage over gTLD names
6
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Figure 5: Distribution of various top-level domains
and ccSLD per operation territory
so that it can be made sure that only eligible registrants are
granted the ownership of respective domain names [28, 88],
given that such policies are adequately enforced by respec-
tive registries.
As summarized in Table 2, whereas half of domain names
are registered under generic TLDs, the remaining major-
ity (≈ 45%) makes use of sponsored TLDs and names within
the .us state-code namespace, and the rest 5 percent opts
for country code top-level domains.. It is noteworthy that
the .us locality namespace exhibits a relatively low penetra-
tion among AAs. For example, the usage of canonical forms
[ci,co].<locality>.<state-code>.us for cities or coun-
ties: we observe that for every 5 city which have the term city
in its domain name there exists only 1 city which uses the
foreseen naming pattern, and for every 4 county choosing to
have the term county in its domain name, there is only one
county opting for the canonical form.
Finally, it is examined if the specific choice of top-level
domains for an organization correlates with the organiza-
tion’s field of operation. Figure 5 depicts how widespread
various TLD types are in use in different fields of operation.
It is noteworthy that educational and military organizations
make exclusive use of restricted TLDs (.edu and .mil re-
spectively), whereas gTLDs remain the more popular choice
among the others. This figure also confirms the previous
observations that the majority of remaining organizations,
regardless of field of operation, opt for generic TLDs instead
of taking advantage of special namespaces within the well-
organized structured of .us namespace.
5.3 DNSSEC Deployment
We used drill to chase DNS signatures and verify if a do-
main has properly activated DNSSEC. All TLDs in use by
AAs (see Table 2) support DNSSEC except a number of .
us ccSLD domains: out of 50 total state ccSLDs under .us
namespace, 32 have been used by AA organizations with
only 18 supporting DNSSEC. Figure 6 depicts the state cc-
SLDs, which support DNSSEC (blue), which do not support
(red), and those which are not used by any of organizations
in our data set (white).
Not Supported
Supported
Not Used
Figure 6: Support for DNSSEC among .us ccSLDs in
use
Although ≈ 57% of TLDs in use support DNSSEC, less
than 8% of AA domain names have DNSSEC enabled. To
our surprise even among .gov second-level domains which
are mandated to implement DNSSEC [83] less than 10% (30)
have support for DNSSEC. Lack of DNSSEC, as mentioned
in Section 3, specifically in combination with DV certificates,
jeopardizes the identification of the domain name owner.
6 WEB PKI ANALYSIS
The ecosystem of Web PKI evolves around X.509 certificates
and SSL/TLS protocols. We investigate the deployment of
both techniques in the context of Alerting Authorities to
answer the following questions:
(1) To which extent do AAs adapt web PKI?
(2) Do hosts use up-to-date SSL/TLS protocols and secure
libraries?
(3) How is the landscape of X.509 shaped among AAs?
6.1 Current Deployment of Certificates
To have a better understanding of the current deployment
of web certificates, we gathered a snapshot of SSL/TLS de-
ployment on public servers of Alerting Authorities.
Out of the total 1327 unique names, 1187 hosts (≈ 89%)
support SSL/TLS with 1130 hosts (≈ 95%) delivering valid
X.509 certificates. Within the remaining 57 hosts, 17 use ex-
pired certificates, 9 use self-signed certificates, and 1 has
self-signed certificates in its certificate chain. The validity
of certificates provided by the remaining 30 hosts could not
be verified due to some kind of misconfiguration, e.g., use of
invalid certificates or certificates with missing issuer infor-
mation. Recall that we use OpenSSL trusted root certificates
for validation.
Table 3 combines our findings from this Section and Sec-
tion 5 to reveal different combinations of DNS and X.509
certificate characteristics, linked to different levels of assur-
ance according to Table 1. In Table 4, we group our results
by organization types. Due to low penetration of DNSSEC,
popularity of open TLDs, and pervasiveness of DV certifi-
cates among AAs (§ 5), only 20% of AA are considered to
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Table 2: Top-level domains in use by alerting authorities
TLD Registration Registry Statistics
Type Label DNSSEC Restricted Fee/year Name Country Share Count DNSSEC
gTLD
.com ✓ ✘ < 15 $ Verisign US 19.44 % 258 2
.org ✓ ✘ < 15 $ Public Internet Registry US 26.15 % 347 5
.net ✓ ✘ < 15 $ Verisign US 4.37 % 58 0
.info ✓ ✘ < 15 $ Afilias US 0.15 % 2 0
50 % 665 7
ccTLD
.cc ✓ ✘ < 15 $ eNIC 1 US 0.07 % 1 0
.co ✓ ✘ < 20 $ .CO Internet S.A.S 2 US 0.07 % 1 0
.us ✓ (✓) < 15 $ Neustar US 4.89 % 65 0
5.04 % 67 0
ccSLD .<code>.us (✓) ✓ – Neustar US 17.71 % 235 2
sTLD
.edu ✓ ✓ 77 $ Educase 3 US 0.45 % 6 0
.gov ✓ ✓ 400 $ General Services Administration US 25.92 % 344 30
.mil ✓ ✓ – Defense Information Systems Agency US 0.75 % 10 10
27.12 % 360 40
Unique domain names 1327
1 subsidiary of Verisign, 2 subsidiary of Neustar, 3 operated by Verisign
Table 3: Overview of DNS properties and certificates
for all AAWeb servers that support SSL/TLS
Domain Name Certificate
Restricted
delegation
Supports
DNSSEC DV O/EV Assurance1 # Names
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  29 (< 1%)
✘ ✓ ✓ (✓) G# 2
✓ ✘ ✓ (✓) G# 132
✘ ✘ ✓ (✓) G# 117
Total: 251 (≈ 19%)
* * ✓ ✘ # 850
* * ✘ ✘ # 197
Total: 1047 (≈ 80$)
Grand Total: 1327
1  strong,G# weak,# inadequate (see Table 1)
be best equipped against common threats to trustworthy
communication.
6.2 SSL/TLS Implementations
From our sample set of 1187 SSL/TLS hosts, we had to re-
move 3 hosts; one due to redirection to an already examined
host, one due to sever misconfiguration making further anal-
ysis futile, and one due to domain drop catching during our
analysis. It should be noted that SSL/TLS analysis given here
Table 4: Level of assurance per sector for AA Web
servers that support SSL/TLS
Certificate1 Assurance2
Type N/A DV OV EV  G# #
Public Safety 102 415 119 8 10 117 517
Governmental 73 318 102 6 7 101 391
Law Enforcement 21 110 31 0 5 26 131
Military 1 4 5 1 6 0 5
Educational 0 0 4 0 0 4 0
Other 0 3 3 1 1 3 3
Total 197 850 264 16 29 251 1047
1 N/A: none or invalid certificate, DV: domain, OV: organization, EV: extended
validation
2  strong,G# weak,# inadequate (see Table 1)
has been carried out regardless of the validity of provided
X.509 certificate.
6.2.1 Supported Protocol Versions. Security flaws, outdated
algorithms, or broken cryptography are among the reasons
for introducing newer TLS protocols while deprecating the
older ones. SSLv2 and SSLv3 [47] are inherently considered
insecure (see RFC 6176 [104] and POODLE attack [75]), in
contrast to TLS protocols [30–32, 92], which are considered
vulnerable if implemented or configured improperly. Conse-
quently, SSL versions 2 and 3 are deprecated [14, 104], and
TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1 are planned to be deprecated in the
future [74].
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Figure 7: SSL/TLS support among AAs compared to
global SSL/TLS deployment
Our analysis shows that even though no host offers only
SSL, there are still 14 hosts that only offer either SSLv3 or
TLS 1; 4 hosts that offer only TLS 1; and the rest offering at
least TLS 1.2. Figure 7 depicts the relative share of various
SSL/TLS protocols among Alerting Authorities websites in
comparison to the deployment of SSL/TLS on the global
scale [66].
6.2.2 Cipher Suites in Use. The parameters of an SSL/TLS
session are agreed upon in terms of a cipher suite [47] (for-
merly known as cipher-kind [34]). In general, a cipher suite
defines (i) authentication method, (ii) key exchange algo-
rithm, (iii) encryption algorithm, and (iv) message authenti-
cation algorithm. To cover a wider variety of clients, servers
in general support a multitude of cipher suites with different
levels of security which we discuss next. Note that SSL cipher
kinds are not part of our analysis.
Authentication. Whenever authentication is required, it is
crucial for hosts to avoid ciphers with anonymous authenti-
cation as this defeats the purpose of source identification and
opens the doors for monkey-in-the-middle attacks. In our
analysis, only 2 hosts (≈ 0.1%) provide ciphers with anony-
mous authentication, whereas the majority of 1150 (≈ 97%)
hosts cater for ciphers with RSA authentication, 68 (≈ 5%)
ECDSA, and 249 (≈ 21%) the newest TLS 1.3 suites which
allow for ad hoc selection of RSA, ECDSA or pre-shared keys
for authentication.
Key Exchange. For key exchange, i.e., establishing a shared
symmetric key for further efficient encryption, two factors
should be noted: (i) weak keys during exchange should be
avoided, and (ii) perfect forward secrecy (PFS) should be
provided. Here, we follow the NIST recommendation [13] of
at least 112 bit security strength for key exchange algorithms
and key sizes, while considering everything below as weak,
i.e., 1024 bit key size for Deffie-Hellman (DH) and RSA key
exchange and 160-223 bit keys for elliptic curve DH (ECDH).
Perfect forward secrecy guarantees that session keys are
not compromised even if the asymmetric key-pairs used to
create those keys are (retrospectively) compromised. Among
Table 5: Relative share of vulnerable hosts
CVE-ID CWE-ID Name
CVSS 2.0
Score1 %
CVE-2012-4929 CWE-310 CRIME 2.6 < 1%
CVE-2015-0204 CWE-310 FREAK 4.3 < 1%
CVE-2014-0224 CWE-310 CCS 5.8 < 1%
CVE-2017-17382 CWE-327 ROBOT 4.3 < 1%
CVE-2016-0800 CWE-200C WE-310 DROWN 4.3 <1%
CVE-2014-3566 CWE-310 POODLE 4.3 ~ 5%
CVE-2015-4000 CWE-310 Logjam 4.3 ~ 7%
CVE-2011-1473 CWE-264 Sec. client reneg. 5.0 ~ 8%
CVE-2013-2566 CWE-310 RC4 4.3 ~ 11%CVE-2015-2808 4.3
CVE-2013-3587 CWE-310 BREACH 2.6 ~ 60%
1Low: 0.0–3.9, Medium: 4.0–6.9, High: 7.0–10.0
analyzed hosts, none is limited to only weak key exchange,
one still supports deprecated insecure export cipher suites,
120 (≈ 10%) provide weak (EC)DH key exchange cipher suites
alongside non-weak suites, and five only support RSA key
exchange (no PFS). Moreover, a total of 1180 hosts (≈ 99%)
provide cipher suites which support PFS. It is noteworthy
that RSA key exchange alone (without ephemeral DH) does
not support PFS so if the server is compromised (and in turn
its private keys), the session keys can also be considered
compromised as well.
Encryption and Message Authentication. For data en-
cryption, our data shows that weak, broken, or deprecated
ciphers (RFC 7225 [100]), e.g., DES [36], 3DES [13, 78], RC2
and RC4 [87], and even NULL-encryption ciphers are still
offered. Nonetheless, nearly all hosts offer suites with strong
AES (128 and 256) ciphers and none offers only weak or
broken ciphers. Respectively, although weak message au-
thentication codes, e.g., MD5 and SHA1, are still in use, the
majority of hosts give clients the possibility of choosing
ciphers with stronger MACs such as AEAD, which is the
default in TLS 1.3.
6.2.3 Susceptibility to Vulnerabilities. How aforementioned
weaknesses or misconfiguration in authentication, key ex-
change, encryption, MAC algorithms, or other server config-
urations can practically impact the communication is studied
here on the basis of known vulnerabilities that affect con-
fidentiality, data integrity, or service availability (see CIA-
triad [108]).
We tested known hosts against a set of select vulnerabil-
ities and summarized the results in Table 5. The Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [72] used here is an
open and standardized mean of quantifying the severity of
vulnerabilities based on base, temporal, and environmental
metric groups which characterize the vulnerability. It can
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Table 6: Count of unique hosts with at least 1 publicly
logged certificate per issuer
Year
CA ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 ’15 ’16 ’17 ’18 ’19
Comodo† 3 7 15 21 29 38 62 92 238 304 299
DigiCert 31 53 70 83 92 105 120 133 146 263 281
Entrust 7 13 22 25 34 32 33 39 40 44 48
GeoTrust‡ 0 5 29 49 54 59 63 67 68 61 29
GoDaddy 25 54 80 109 141 183 215 249 290 330 347
LetsEncrypt†† 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 102 210 335
Sectigo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 228
Verisign‡ 18 45 49 43 43 42 35 27 17 6 0
All Hosts‡‡ 122 244 298 356 398 458 517 630 830 1012 1109
† Rebranded to Sectigo in 2018. ‡ Acquired by DigiCert in 2017.
†† Beta in 2015; public launch in 2016.
‡‡ Denotes the # of unique hosts per year with at least one logged certificate.
be seen that the majority of hosts are resilient to our tested
attacks and although more than half are potentially vulnera-
ble to BREACH attack, the risk of such attack is relatively
low (a score of 2.6).
6.3 Historic X.509 Certificate Landscape
The historic analysis of X.509 certificates collected from Cer-
tificate Transparency logs (§ 4) helps us to gain a better
understanding of security policy changes related to Alerting
Authorities and CAs. We span ten years. It should be noted
that the total number of organizations with publicly logged
certificates changes for each year. We consider this in the
following and normalize the results either with respect to
the number of organizations or total number of certificates
valid per year.
6.3.1 Certificate Authorities. In addition to common regu-
lations, certificate authorities implement and follow their
own set of policies. From the perspective of relying parties,
i.e., web users, such policies are transparent and as long as a
CA is included in a user’s trust store, it is considered trust-
worthy. For the subscribers, however, these policies among
other factors such as annual fees, offered certificate types,
and operation costs are decisive in choosing an appropriate
CA.
The list of top CAs with an average of yearly 20 unique
subscribers (hosts) in the last decade and the number of
respective covered hosts per year is given in Table 6. We use
the term cover to differentiate from issuance: if a host, for
example, is issued a certificate by a CA valid from 2010 to
2013, we consider this host to be covered by that CA for 2010,
2011, 2012, and 2013. Respectively, if a CA issues multiple
short-lived certificates (e.g., 90 days) for a host within a given
year, we only count that host as covered once in that year by
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Figure 8: Market share of top CAs in the past decade
the issuing CA. This would avoid the data skew in favor of
issuers with lower certificate validity windows and higher
certification rate per year. It also should be noted that a
single host can have certificates issued from different CAs.
The bottom row puts the above number in relation to the
total number of CA subscribers for each year and for all
observed CAs. For example, in 2019, a third of 1109 hosts
with at least one logged certificate made use of Let’s Encrypt
DV certificates. Figure 8 depicts these findings in terms of
relative market share development in the past decade.
Table 6 and Figure 8 highlight two factors evidently de-
cisive for AAs in their choice of CA: convenience and cost
factors. GoDaddy, for example, which has been the market
leader among AAs for about two thirds of the past decade,
provides web hosting and domain name registration beside
certification services in convenient packages; and Let’s En-
crypt [4], which has surged to the top in the short period
after its public offering, offers automated DV certification at
no cost.
6.3.2 Validation types and assurance profiles. In Section 6.1,
we showed that currently only 20% of AAs honor security
profiles that are strongly resilient against threats to trust-
worthy communication (see Tables 3 and 4). Historically,
however, as depicted in Figure 9, a higher share of alerting
authorities provisioned for such measures. When compared
with the share of various certificate validation types (DV,
OV, and EV), it becomes evident how the decreasing usage
of OV certificates is directly proportional to the reduction
of preferred assurance profiles. At the same time the surg-
ing popularity of DV certificates has led to an increase in
cases of what we consider as inadequately trustworthy (no
identification).
It should be noted that due to lack of historic data regard-
ing DNSSEC penetration among AAs, we made a simple
assumption that historic support for DNSSEC among AAs
equals to its current penetration state (see Section 5.3)
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Figure 9: Development of certificate characteristics and assurance profiles in the past decade
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cates with more than 10 unique SAN entries
6.3.3 Certificate Sharing. Except EV certificates, both DV
and OV certificates allow wild card names as subject alter-
native names (SAN) to avoid enumerating all fully qualified
domain names (FQDN) under the control of the certificate
holder. In practice, the SAN extension also allows sharing a
certificate among different hosts. For example, In 2019 the
federal government was issued OV certificates with more
than 600 SAN entries each. Sharing certificates among var-
ious hosts expands the attack surface and increases opera-
tional costs since if one of the hosts is compromised or the
certificate is revoked, every other host also need to config-
ured with a new certificate.
Multitenancy web hosting and security service providers
(both public or government exclusive) are making use of
shared certificates as depicted in Figure 10 (Note that Let’s
Encrypt certificates only allow up to 100 DNS type SAN).
In our analysis, we also noticed an increasing number of
certificate sharing among hosts which do not belong to the
same logical entity. Most critically also among OV certifi-
cates where a service provider obtains a certificate under its
name and lists the host name of its customers as SAN, prac-
tically defeating the identification purpose of the certificate.
As the time of writing, for example, we observe cases of such
certificates listing subject alternative names that obviously
do not belong to the same entity, e.g., mo.gov, asap.farm,
and incapsula.com under the same certificate. In this very
specific case, records from the Wayback Machine (by the
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Figure 11: Validity distribution of AA logged certifi-
cates per year
Internet Archive) show that asap.farm has previously be-
longed to Missouri Department of Agriculture [81] but it
was never removed from certificate as the ownership was
transferred to another entity.
6.3.4 Certificate Validity. A certificate is presumed valid if,
among others, it is deployed within its validity period, is
issued by a trustworthy CA, carries a valid signature, bound
to the correct subject name, and is not revoked (see RFC
5280 [27]). Checking revocation status is the most expensive
operation among aforementioned factors, thus in many cases
it is either performed inadequately or ignored altogether
by browsers (partly in favor of proprietary solutions) [69].
Consequently, in the past years both CAs and browser ven-
dors have been negotiating to cap and reduce certificate
lifetimes [44–46] as an effort to reduce security risks due to
misissued or revoked certificates.
As depicted in Figure 11, the lifetime of certificates uti-
lized by AAs has been constantly decreasing. This trend can
partly be attributed to consensus among CAs and browser
vendors to reduce certificate lifetimes, but also due to ris-
ing popularity of CAs which are specialized on gratuitous
and automated DV certificates such as Let’s Encrypt (fixed
lifetime of 90 days).
7 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study investigat-
ing how Alerting Authorities in the U.S. (as part of broader
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critical infrastructure) implement measures to cater for trust-
worthy Web-based communication and service provision.
Previous research on trust in online emergency service pro-
vision mainly focuses on form and content and its relation
to the perception of trustworthiness [18, 35, 56], conception
of trustworthy emergency communication and collabora-
tion systems [19, 85] or simply best practices in building
trust [10, 70]. Although previous research has already high-
lighted how knowing who is behind an online emergency
service impacts the trustworthiness of their respective ser-
vices [35, 70, 86], we observe a research gap when it comes
to evaluating the measures at one’s disposal to reach this
goal. More specifically, the interplay of domain names, X.509
certificates, and transport layer security protocols has not
been investigated to our best knowledge. Respectively, in
this section we limit ourselves to an overview of related work
which studies these technologies on their own.
Domain Namespace and DNSSEC. The influence of a
domain name on authenticating or at least recognizing the
real-world entity behind that name has been investigated
in terms of general trustworthiness associated with TLDs
and impersonation of trusted entities through domain name
masquerading. Walther, Wang, and Loh [106] examine how
choice of TLD can positively impact the credibility of health
websites. Seckler et al. [99] investigate how a relevant do-
main name, e.g., a known TLD, can positively enforce famil-
iarity and in turn increase trust. Similarly, a yearly report [43]
commissioned by the Public Internet Registry (responsible
for .org, .ngo, and .ong TLDs) examines the trustworthi-
ness of select TLDs among NGO donors.
A closely related topic is how the domain namespace of
malicious websites is structured and operated. Hao et al. [49]
studies the registration behaviors, e.g., naming patterns, of
spammers for .com TLD. Korczynski et al. [63] show how low
pricing and registration barriers alongside the possibility of
bulk registration is an enabler for malicious actors to migrate
to new gtLDs. In a longitudinal study of typosquatting, Agten
et al. [6] reveals how registration fees and registry policies
can attract or deter malicious actors; practically determining
the credibility of such TLDs (the top three most abused TLDs
in the world are new gTLDs [89]). And Antonakakis et al. [8]
introduce a reputation system for DNS to detect malicious
domain names. Different studies show how scammers try
to impersonate other entities by partly or fully integrating
legitimate domain names in their own domain names [6,
62, 94, 103] or even by using homonymous names using
internationalized domain names [102].
With regard to namespace security, studies in the past pin-
point a relatively low DNSSEC penetration due to various
factors ranging from lack of support by local resolvers to
server misconfigurations [23, 50, 68, 84] despite more than
90% of all TLDs being signed and supporting DNSSEC [93].
The prevalence of DNSSEC among various types of organiza-
tions, such as educational, military, commercial, etc. has not
been subject of study to determine if there is a correlation
between field of operation and sensibility for DNS security
measures. The only exception is the fine-grained, i.e., in-
cluding second level domains, regular analysis of DNSSEC
deployment among U.S. governmental agencies within the
.gov namespace [79, 95].
Web PKI. Throughout the years, various measurements
have characterized X.509 certificates in use over the Inter-
net in terms of validity, issuing CAs, key strength, etc. [22,
33, 55, 73] Among these, Mishari et al. [73] investigates the
difference between certificates of legitimate and fraudulent
websites. The study by Holz et al. [55] has the advantage of
being performed from different vantage points spread over
theworld. Themeasurements byDurumeric et al. [33] is note-
worthy as it goes beyond mere X.509 certificate analysis and
investigates the dependencies among root and intermediate
CAs, their market share, and the characteristics of respective
certificates. And finally, the measurements performed by
Chung et al. [22] aim to understand why a majority of certifi-
cates advertised over IPv4 are invalid. It should be noted that
except the last study, the others have been carried out before
the public launch of Let’s Encrypt [4] (2016), and antedate
various mergers and rebrandings which has changed the
Web PKI landscape ever since.
Specifically related to the topic of our work are studies
which investigate the trustworthiness of CAs in general and
their policies specially in enabling fraud and impersonation.
Delignat-Lavaud et al. [29], for example, investigate the con-
formance of CAs to the CA/Browser Forum guidelines, which
in turn can influence trustworthiness of a CA. Others have
defined various metrics to qualify [20, 37] or quantify trust-
worthiness of CAs [51] beyond technical measures. In a re-
cent study Schwittmann, Wander and Weis [98] exhibit how
various CAs are susceptible to attacks on DV certification
processes that can practically lead to domain impersonation.
Similarly, Roberts et al. [94] studies which CAs are responsi-
ble for issuing DV certificates to malicious target-embedded
domains.
Finally, regarding transport layer security protocols, Kotzias
et al. [64] characterize both the deployment of SSL/TLS by
web hosts and its usage by various applications with respect
to relevant security issues.
8 KEY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
Our results draw a rather alarming picture of the current
online emergency management landscape regarding trust-
worthy communication. Along the line of our key findings,
12
Measuring Namespaces, Web Certificates, and DNSSEC of AA
we briefly discuss the possible reasons for the observed defi-
ciencies and suggest alternatives.
Only about half of AAs use dedicated names. An or-
ganization without a dedicated domain name depends on
its hosting entity, i.e., parent organization or other service
provider, for authentication and data security. From a user
perspective, there is no viable way of discriminating the
organization from its hosting entity. Even if organizations
are reluctant to acquire own second-level domain names,
they should at least be assigned with their own subdomains
instead of being subsumed in the path segment of a URL.
The majority of organizations opt for generic TLDs.
This poses a major threat of pishing and typosquatting by
not taking the advantage of closed registries and restricted
namespaces such as the .us locality namespace. In contrast
to gTLDs, higher registration fees, bureaucratic hurdles, and
longer delegation processing times are among discouraging
factors, which call for governmental support and can effec-
tively be addressed by policy-makers through price caps and
easier access for eligible organizations which fulfill the strict
requirements.
Only a fraction of AAs care for DNSSEC. Securing do-
main names is seemingly a non-priority for investigated or-
ganizations as the low penetration rate of DNSSEC suggests.
Although DNSSEC suffers low deployment on the global
scale in general, it is an indispensable component in secur-
ing emergency communication as part of the broader critical
infrastructure. Yet, it should be noted that in some cases due
to lack of support registrants are forced to abandon DNSSEC
in favor of other factors, e.g., registering under a .us locality
name for which there is, surprisingly, no DNSSEC support
(see Figure 6).
We also note that although domain names under .gov
namespaces are mandated to use DNSSEC [83], the low sup-
port for DNSSEC has its roots in operational and organiza-
tional mismanagement rather than technical issues.
Convenience and cost factors have a high impact on
CA preferences. Our study shows that currently about 15%
of alerting authorities provide either none or invalid certifi-
cates. This can be traced back to carelessness regarding the
Web PKI trust model (self-signed certificates) or additional
(not only financial) configuration [65] and certification costs.
Rapid growth of Let’s Encrypt with its fully automated cer-
tificate issuance and renewal is an indication of how the
aforementioned factors influence the decision for choosing
an appropriate CA.
A rising trend, which we consider as rather worrisome
for critical infrastructure, is the usage of domain validation
(DV) or shared certificates in multitenancy settings. As both
cannot cater for identification, they remain inappropriate for
trustworthy communication (Section 3). In case of domain
validation, we encourage the stakeholders to reconsider se-
mantically equivalent alternative of TLSA domain issued cer-
tificates (DANE EE) as they provide higher resilience against
spoofing in contrast to DV certificates [98]. In general DANE
can be used to remove ambiguity regarding public keys and
responsible CAs for a domain name. Regarding shared certifi-
cates, we suggest abandoning them completely to minimize
attack surface. We also encourage CAs to avoid issuing OV
certificates for service providers without ensuring that all
the listed subject alternative names belong to the same orga-
nization.
Security measures for critical infrastructure should not
be guided by convenience or cost factors. In an ideal setting
certification of specific organizations would be limited to
dedicated CAs (similar to InCommon Certificate Service for
higher education institutes) and subordination rules [61] are
enforced by all other trusted CAs to avoid issuing certificates
for these protected organizations and namespaces.
Responsibility beyond Alerting Authorities. The scope
of trustworthy communication goes beyond our investiga-
tions and extends to consumers as well as infrastructure
operators such as CAs, ISPs, and browser vendors. There is
still a gap between CA practices and guidelines [29], some
automated DV certification services are susceptible to im-
personation attacks [94, 98], and not all root CAs restrict
certification scope for their intermediate CAs [33]. DNS reg-
istrars do not offer DNSSEC by default or free of cost [24] and
ISPs often do not bother to operate DNSSEC-aware recursive
resolvers that properly verify signed DNS records [23, 107].
Browser vendors should also provide better security usabil-
ity by avoiding confusing SSL/TLS warnings [7], improve
instead of abandoning visual cues for different certificate
types [38, 54, 80], and start offering alternative CA trustwor-
thiness assessment measures beyond the standard binary
trust model [20, 37, 51].
9 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper we provided an overview of how alerting au-
thorities (AA) in the U.S. are structured within the domain
namespace, how widespread is DNSSEC in securing their
domain names, and how Web PKI and transport layer secu-
rity protocls are used for authentication and data security.
We uncovered deficiencies and discussed alternatives while
emphasizing that respective solutions are not necessarily
technical but operational as well as political. Protecting crit-
ical infrastructure for emergency communication and public
safety entails addressing operational and policy challenges
on national and international levels and calls for commit-
ment of all stakeholders from service providers to intermedi-
ate infrastructure operators and browser vendors alongside
policy-makers.
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In the future this work can be extended beyond the U.S.
territory while providing a comparison basis for other coun-
tries. Furthermore, the role of intermediate infrastructure
and further dependency structures can be investigated in
depth.
Data Disclosure. We will make our analysis toolchain
as well as all measurement data (i.e., domain names, Web
certificates etc. of alerting authorities) publicly available.
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APPENDIX
Table 7: Regular expressions applied on an AA name
to categorize its field of operation (in order of applica-
tion).
Category Regular expression
Military [^[:alnum:]]fort|^fort|army|missile|base|
pfpa
Governmental county|counties|city|commission|borough|
town|village|authority|council|
government|national|aviation|parish|
correction
Educational university
Law Enforcement police|sheriff|investigation|’law
enforcement’|patrol|’homeland
security’|intelligence
Public Safety 911|’9-1-1’|emergency|ema|eom|ohsep|fire|
safety|communication|dispatch
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